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Abstract
The emergence of groundwater markets has helped in mitigating inequality
in physical access to the groundwater resources, on the one hand, but on
the other hand, it may lead to exploitation of the buyers of water, i.e.
resource-poor, small farmers. For the sellers of water, it is becoming a
remunerative business economically, leading to serious environmental as
well as social concerns. The present study conducted in the arid and semi-
arid zones of Rajasthan has addressed these issues. The study has shown
that prevailing terms of water transactions, particularly ‘in-kind’ terms,
lead to the over-exploitation of groundwater resources. The credit policies
and the power pricing policies of the government also help in the
unsustainable and inequitable use of this resource. Water policy ensuring
mandatory recharging of the abandoned wells mainly for the sellers of
water is the need of hour for the efficient and sustainable use of this
scarce natural resource. The analysis of farmers’ decision to participate in
water markets employing logit regression has suggested that the farmers
having higher fragmented landholdings have higher probability of buying
groundwater. Joint ownership of wells is negatively associated with the
farmers’ probability of buying groundwater. This implies that the
consolidation of holdings or installing cooperative wells may economize
the irrigation investment and lead to efficient management of resources of
the farmers and sustainable utilization of water. In the national and state
water policies as well as in the Model Bill to regulate and control the
groundwater resources, this aspect has not been given any emphasis.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of groundwater trade among farmers is though
localized, fragmented, and in the process of evolution as informal market
institution, it does have substantial equity and efficiency implications for the
utilization of groundwater resources and irrigation assets. Impressed by
these positive effects, many researchers have projected groundwater markets
as an institutional option for the efficient and equitable use of groundwater
and irrigation assets (Shah, 1993; Shah and Raju, 1988; Kolavalli and Chicoine,
1989; Saleth, 1992).
The groundwater is highly scarce in the Rajasthan state and is depleting
fast. It is a major factor of production in the agrarian economy of Rajasthan.
The state is mostly covered by the arid (57.31% of total geographical area)
and semi-arid (31.35%) regions, and it receives less than 500 mm rainfall
annually and that too is erratic. The groundwater draft in the state is more
than its recharge, particularly in the arid and semi-arid regions and has
caused deepening of groundwater level by 1 to 3 metres every year. The
declining water level has resulted in a widespread failure of wells and has
further led to increase in the cost of well-deepening, installing new wells
and pumping. This has resulted in inequality in the access to groundwater
for irrigation among resource-poor marginal and small farmers as well as
resource-rich, large farmers. This has led to the emergence of Ground Water
Markets (GWMs) for providing access to irrigation waters (Sharma, 2002).
The ownership of private wells is confined mostly to resource-rich large
farmers who have emerged as sellers of water. The surplus water after
meeting their own requirements is sold to the marginal and small farmers,
who become the buyers to avoid the huge initial investments needed to
install a well. Even large farmers, who have fragmented holdings and are
not able to install wells on each parcel of land, have resorted to buying
water from the neighbouring well-owners. The phenomenon of groundwater
marketing by farmers in many parts of the country has been well documented
by Dhawan (1991), Kolavalli and Chicoine (1989), Patel and Patel (1970)
and Shah (1988; 1993). Although the GWMs are localized in nature, these
have significant implications for the equitable distribution and sustainable
use of groundwater resource. Here, an attempt has been made to understand
the prevailing practice of groundwater marketing in the state of Rajasthan.
The practice of selling and buying of water for irrigation, industrial, and
domestic uses has become a common feature. These informal water markets
are widespread in the state of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
Pradesh, Punjab and West Bengal. These markets are limited to localized
water trading among neighbouring farmers. The development and functioningSharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 41
of groundwater markets depends upon many socio-economic and agro-
climatic factors, farm characteristics and technology, and farmers’
managerial ability. The specific objectives of the present paper were:
· To quantify the relative significance of important factors by using logistic
regression analysis
· To study the structure and conduct of groundwater markets in the study
area; and
· To review the legal issues involved in water transfers and the policies
related to groundwater development.
Methodological Framework
Water has been a scarce resource in Rajasthan, particularly in its arid
and semi-arid regions. The groundwater is the only source for irrigating
crops and sustaining life. There has been enough inequality in the distribution
of irrigation resources in Rajasthan, where the study has been carried out.
The Study Area
The arid and semi-arid regions of Rajasthan, spread respectively over
the western and northeastern parts of the state, cover more than 85 per
cent of the total geographical area of the state. The rainfall is lowest in the
western part and moderate in the northeast area. The groundwater has
been the only source of irrigation in both the regions, as more than 90 per
cent of the irrigation-demand is met by it. Of the total water availability in
the state, only one-fifth is available in the arid region and two-fifths in the
semi-arid region. Groundwater has been comparatively less scarce in the
semi-arid region, while it is most scarce in the arid region as is clear from
the fact that the groundwater level was 50-60 m deep in the arid region, and
25-40 m in the semi-arid region. The depth of tube-wells is about 125-200 m
in the arid region and 70-125 m in the semi-arid region. The dug-wells and
dug-cum-bore wells have almost been abandoned in the arid region.
The Sampling Frame
Following the multi-stage sampling technique, 280 farmers were selected
from eight villages of four districts from arid and semi-arid regions of
Rajasthan. Jodhpur and Nagaur for the arid region and Alwar and Jaipur
for the semi-arid region were selected purposively. These districts were
categorized as over-exploited1 or in critical stage of groundwater
development. From each selected district, one block from the over-exploited
category of blocks was selected randomly. A cluster of two villages was42 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
selected randomly from each selected block. In total eight villages were
selected for the study. Fifteen per cent of the total farmers were drawn
randomly from the list of farmers. After selecting the sample farmers, they
were categorized2 into self-users (SU), self-users + sellers (SU+S), self-
users + sellers + buyers (SU+S+B), self-users + buyers (SU+B), buyers
(B) and non-users (NU).
Database and Analytical Tools
The study used the primary data collected from 280 sample farmers
during the agricultural year 1999-2000. The study was adequately supported
by the secondary information collected from the relevant government
departments.
The logistic regression analysis was carried out to quantify the relative
importance of factors influencing farmers’ decision to buy groundwater for
irrigation. In logistic regression analysis, only buyers and sellers of water
were included, as farmers of these categories were only indulged in water
marketing activity. Farmers in the groundwater market categorized as Self-
Users + Buyers + Sellers were not included in the analysis to maintain
mutually exclusiveness of the sample.
In the groundwater markets, buying of irrigation water was a
dichotomous-dependent variable. Its determinants were assessed using logit
model based on logistic cumulative distribution function (McFeddan, 1974
and Maddala, 1983). This technique has been found useful in situations
where we either did not have enough information to study how the actual
decisions were made or were just interested in understanding the relative
role of factors likely to affect such decisions in a probabilistic sense. The
logit technique allowed examination of the effects of a number of variables
on the underlying probability of buying or selling the irrigation water.
The behavioural model used to examine the factors affecting the
purchase of groundwater was:
Yi = g (Zi) …(1)
Zi = a+S bk Xki …(2)
where,
Yi = The observed response of the ith farmer (i.e. the binary variable Y =
1 for buyer and Y = 0 for a non-buyer)
Zi = An underlying and unobserved index for the ith farmer (when Z
exceeded some threshold Z*, the farmer was observed to be buyer;
otherwise non-buyer)Sharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 43
Xki= The kth explanatory variable of ith farmer
i = 1, 2, ………, N, where, N was the number of farmers
k = 1, 2, …….. M, where, M was the total number of explanatory variables
a = Constant, and
b = Vector of coefficients.
The logit model postulated that Pi, the probability that ith farmer
purchased groundwater, was a function of an index variable Zi summarizing
a set of the explanatory variables. In fact, Zi was equal to the logarithm of
the odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of probability that the farmer purchased
groundwater to the probability that he did not purchase and it could be
estimated as a linear function of explanatory variable (Xki). This could be
mathematically expressed as Eq. (3):
        
Pi
    
M
Zi = ln{——–} = a + S   bk Xki …(3)
           
1 - Pi
   
k=1
Equation (3) was the logit model (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981), and
once this equation was estimated, Pi could be calculated as :
   1
Pi = f (Zi) = f (a + S b Xi )= ——– …(4)
 1+e-zi
            1
    = ——————– …(5)
     1+e-(a+S b k Xki)
where, ‘e’ represents base of the natural logarithms and approximately
equals to 2.718.
The goodness of fit of the model was tested by three approaches. Firstly,
predictions were compared with the observed outcomes and expressed in
percentage of correctly predicted. Secondly, 2-times the log of the likelihood
(-2LL) estimate was used as a measure of how well the estimated model
fitted the data. A good model was one that resulted in a high likelihood of
the observed results. To test the null hypothesis that the model fitted perfectly,
-2LL had a chi-square distribution with N-M degrees of freedom. In this
test the large observed significance level indicated that the model did not
differ significantly from the perfect model. Lastly, chi-square test was used.
The difference between –2LL for the model with only a constant (-2LL0)
and –2LL for the current model (-2LLmax) followed Chi-square (c2)44 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
distribution. The degrees of freedom for the Chi-square test were the
difference between the degrees of freedom for two models being used as
{(N-1) – (N-M)}.
Chi-square = – (LL0 – LLmax)
Thus, Chi-square tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all
the explanatory variables in the model except the constant were zero. The
nature and magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the logit model would
help us to identity the relative importance of different factors underlying
groundwater buying-decisions of farmers.
The Model and Hypothesis
The index variable Zi indicating whether a farmer bought groundwater
or not, was expressed as a linear function of the above listed variables as:
Zi = a + b1AREAOWN + b2FRAGMENT + b3PJOINTWL +
b4HPPERWL +  b5EDUCATIO +  b6PFWORK +  b7PNFINC +
b8PHVCR + Ui                 …(6)
where, Ui was the disturbance-term.
AREAOWN: Farm-size was one of the important factors influencing the
purchase of groundwater. The total operational holding was likely to affect
the probability of groundwater purchasing due to the reason that farm-size
and ownership of a irrigation well were directly related. Therefore, a-priori
expectation was that the probability of purchasing of groundwater was
inversely related to the size of farm.
FRAGMENT: Buying of groundwater was crucially dependent on the
degree of fragmentation of farm-holding. With dispersed holding, it was
presumed to be more difficult for a WEM to irrigate all the land of a farmer
than if the land was in a consolidated parcel. It was, therefore, expected a-
priori that a farmer with high degree of fragmentation was relatively more
likely to purchase groundwater.
PJOINTWL: Joint ownership of WEM could reduce purchasing of
groundwater by the farmers. The impact of partnership on the likelihood of
purchasing could be captured by dummy variable for partnership. Therefore,
it was expected that joint ownership of WEM be inversely related with the
probability of groundwater purchasing.
HPPERWL: Higher capacity of the water-lifting device installed on their
well/tube-well could reduce the buying probability of irrigation water.
Therefore, it was expected that groundwater buying probability was
negatively related with the installed capacity of water-lifting device on the
wells.Sharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 45
PHVCR: High-value crops were mustard, cumin, groundnut, cotton and
tomato that occupied higher percentages of gross cropped area in the study
area. A farmer without WEM and with a large percentage of gross cropped
area under high-value crops was relatively more likely to purchase
groundwater to irrigate his crops. However, a farmer with own WEM and
high percentage of gross cropped area under high-value crops might go for
purchasing of groundwater to irrigate his plots located farther from his WEM.
Therefore, nature of the relationship between percentage of gross cropped
area under high-value crops and probability of purchasing of groundwater
could not be established a-priori.
EDUCATIO: Education increased the ability of a farmer to interpret,
understand and modify new information. Thus, it was treated as a proxy for
farmer’s managerial ability. It was, therefore, hypothesized that the probability
of purchasing water by a farmer was inversely related to the farmer’s
education.
PFWORK: The family worker provided potential for intensive cultivation.
A farmer with more family labour might go for purchasing groundwater
because he had more manpower on per farm basis. The nature of relationship
between the percentage of family labour to the total family and purchasing
of groundwater and its probability could not be established a-priori.
PNFINC: The total non-farm income included income from off-farm
employment plus income from off-farm investments. Steady non-farm
income might help a small farm operator to achieve a level of income
comparable to that of the large farmers. So, it was hypothesized that the
probability of purchasing groundwater was directly related to the percentage
of non-farm income of the farmer.
The relative significance of these important factors was quantified by
logistic regression analysis for groundwater buying-decisions of the farmers.
The factors considered to influence the groundwater markets more
apparently were only included in the logit analysis. Age of the head of the
family and value of farm assets were also included in the analysis but due to
high degree of correlation between educational level and age of head of the
family, farm size and farm assets, were subsequently dropped in the final
model. The determinants of groundwater markets for water buying and
selling decisions were examined separately to visualize the differences, if
any.
The Groundwater Markets
The term ‘water markets’ describes a localized, village-level informal
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(WEM) sell water to other farmers at a price. Water availability under
different forms of water markets has given rise to issues related to the
structure and conduct of groundwater markets (GWMs).
Households Participating in Water Markets
A perusal of Table 1 revealed that almost 70 per cent of the total farm
households were participating in water trade either fully or partially. The
sellers of water were 31 per cent, while buyers were about 52 per cent of
the total households. The sellers of water had higher proportion of individual
wells and less area owned per well, which was less fragmented (Table 1).
This induced them to sell surplus water after meeting their own requirements,
whereas buyers had larger size of holdings which were more fragmented.
This explained the behaviour of farmers installing their own irrigation wells
on a big parcel of land to irrigate their crops and to sell surplus water.
However, they had to rely on buying groundwater from the neighbouring
farmers for their other fragments situated away. Also, the buyers had higher
proportion of joint wells and higher fragmented land. They had to rely on
purchasing of water to irrigate their crops. The more fragmented lower size
of holding constrained many farmers from installing their own WEMs. This
resulted in buyers’ form of water markets, resorting exclusively to buying
groundwater.
Accessibility to Water Market
The farm-size category-wise analysis revealed that about 55 per cent
of the small farmers were involved in buying of groundwater, whereas only
one per cent indulged in its selling activity. About 92 per cent of the non-
Table 1. Characteristics of households participating in water markets
Particulars SU SU+S SU+S+B SU+B B NU
Number of households 46 46 40 38 70 40
Average size of land (ha) 7.75 6.92 7.8 4.81 1.85 1.17
No. of fragments per holding 2.15 2.13 3.28 3.05 1.99 1.8
No. of wells 63 65 53 40 0 0
Area/well (ha) 5.74 4.87 5.61 4.71 0 0
Joint wells (%) 51 26 45 77 0 0
Individual wells (%) 49 74 55 23 0 0
SU: Self-users; SU+B: Self-users + buyers; SU+S: Self-users + sellers; BL: buyers;
SU+S+B: Self-users + sellers + buyers; NU: Non-usersSharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 47
users were small farmers and the remaining were semi-medium farmers.
About 72 per cent of the semi-medium farmers were engaged in buying of
groundwater, while 22 per cent were engaged in the selling activity. The
corresponding figures were 47 per cent and 53 per cent for medium farmers,
and 36 per cent and 56 per cent for large farmers (Table 2). This showed
that the groundwater buying activity decreased with the increase in farm-
size, while the selling activity increased.
This explicitly explained that the sellers of water were the farmers with
larger holdings, who had the financial capacity and break-even land to install
their own WEMs and sell surplus water after meeting their own requirements,
while the buyers were the farmers with smaller holdings who did not have
the financial capacity and break-even land to install their own WEMs.
However, Meinzen-Dick (1996), Narayanmoorthy (1994), and Shah and
Raju (1988) have reported that the well-owners, who had small holdings
depicted higher extent of participation in water-selling than those who owned
larger holdings because of having surplus water after irrigating their own
fields. Results were so in Rajasthan on account of higher cost of construction
of tube-wells, due to deeper water levels in the area, and most (about 80%)
of the modern WEMs were in the hands of medium and large or resource-
rich farmers, who had break-even land and resources to install their own
irrigation wells.
Magnitude of Groundwater Buying
The distribution of area irrigated by own irrigation wells and buying
groundwater under different forms of water markets are given in Table 3.
The study revealed that the self-users and self-users + sellers had cent per
cent irrigation of their lands by their own irrigation wells while the lands of
buyers of water were irrigated totally through purchase of groundwater
Table 2. Farm-size category-wise farmers participation in water markets in
Rajasthan
(in per cent)
Farm-holdings SU SU+S SU+S+B SU+B B NU Total
HHs (No.)
Small 3 1 0 3 52 41 90
Semi-medium 6 16 6 29 37 6 54
Medium 26 27 26 17 4 0 100
Large 39 25 31 5 0 0 36
Overall 17 17 14 13 25 14 280
HHs: Households; Small: < 2 ha; Semi-medium: 2-4 ha; Medium: > 4-10 ha;
Large: >10ha48 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
from other farmers. Of the total owned-irrigated area of sample farmers,
nearly 83 per cent was commanded by owned irrigation wells, whereas
around 17 per cent of the total irrigated area was irrigated by buying
groundwater. This implied that in the absence of groundwater markets, nearly
one-fifth of the total area would have remained unirrigated and added to the
non-users category. In other words, the prevalence of groundwater markets
supported about one-fifth area of the total land irrigated by groundwater.
However, Saleth (1998) has estimated that water markets were providing
water for about 6 million hectares or 15 per cent of the total area irrigated
by groundwater in India.
Transactions Terms for Groundwater Markets
The studies have shown that the terms of groundwater transactions
might tend to be rather exploitative. Still, in the wake of failure of traditional
irrigation system, the farmers might opt for purchasing of water at a higher
cost rather than going without it. In the groundwater markets, two broad
types of transactions were observed in the study area: ‘cash-based contracts’,
and ‘in-kind contracts’. The types of contracts on the basis of which GWMs
operated in the study area were:
(a) Hourly terms: In this arrangement, the sellers provided water to the
buyers by charging at hourly rate on cash basis. This type of contract was
prevalent in the semi-arid region in the Jaipur district where only electric-
operated irrigation wells were in operation and the rate was Rs 30 per hour.
In the Alwar district, water was being purchased from electric-operated
irrigation wells by paying Rs 50 per hour, and if it was from a diesel-operated
irrigation well, then the price was Rs 75 per hour; and
(b) Crop-output sharing terms: In this arrangement, the buyers of water
had to surrender a part of their crop-output as price of water to the sellers.
Table 3. Magnitude of groundwater buying in Rajasthan
Water markets        Percentage of owned area irrigated by Total owned area
Own-WEMs Buying water irrigated (ha/hh)
SU 100.00 0.00 7.52
SU+S 100.00 0.00 6.57
SU+S+B 80.87 19.13 6.43
SU+B 71.50 28.50 4.83
B 0.00 100.00 1.41
Total / All 83.07 16.93 5.11
Note: Non-users were not included because farmers of this category had unirrigated
area with them and area with buyers was irrigated by buying groundwater.Sharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 49
This type of contract was observed in the arid region. This was the ‘in-kind’
contract where 40 per cent of crop-output was charged from the buyers of
water at the time of harvest.
It was found that crop-output sharing contracts prevailed in water-
scarce areas, arid region, while the hourly terms of payment were prevalent
mainly in less water-scarce areas, semi-arid region of Rajasthan. About 47
per cent payments for water were through cash mode on hourly basis,
while 53 per cent preferred to pay through crop-output sharing mode. The
well-owners, in general and sellers, in particular determine these terms and
conditions. The temporal change in these terms of contracts took place with
changes in the energy price. The transactions of water among the buyers
and sellers were made by ‘osarabandi’ system, including water-turn for
own farms and buyers’ farms. The water was transported mostly through
plastic pipes (sprinkler pipes) of the sellers of water.
Conduct of Groundwater Markets
There were 86 sellers to 207 buyers of water, i.e. each seller supported
2.41 buyers. The average area irrigated by each water seller was 11.77 ha.
On an average, each seller of water supported buyers’ land up to the extent
of 46.50 per cent of the average area irrigated by them (Table 4). Of the
total hours operated per irrigation well by sellers of water, about 53 per cent
hours were used to irrigate buyers’ fields. Thus, both in the terms of area
and the number of irrigation hours, the extent of groundwater markets seemed
to be considerable.
Costs and Returns from Water Selling
The cost of water extraction and selling price might be viewed as
efficiency of water markets. If the cost of water extraction was equal to
the selling price, water markets could be considered as efficient, if it was




3. Average area irrigated by sellers (ha) 11.77
a. Own field (%) 53.50
b. Buyer’s field (%) 46.50
4. Hours operated per WEM 1170
a. Own field (%) 46.82
b. Buyer’s field (%) 53.1850 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
Table 5. Cost of water extraction and returns from water selling
(Rs per hour)
      Particulars Semi-arid region Arid region
1. Cost of water-extraction
(a) Fixed cost on WEMb 16.65 (72.11)a 14.92 (47.53)
(b) Operating cost on WEMc 6.44 (27.89) 16.47 (52.47)
(c) Total cost 23.09 31.39
2. Average selling price 35.46 122.80
3. Net Income
(a) Over operating cost 18.81 107.88
(b) Over total cost 12.37 91.41
a Figures within the parentheses are percentages of the total cost.
b It included depreciation and interest on fixed investment of tube-well installation,
pump sets, water conveyance structures, etc.
c It included operation and maintenance charges and interest on the working capital.
greater than the selling price, then water markets were regarded as
inefficient ones and if the selling price of water was greater than the cost of
water extraction, then the water markets could be considered as exploitative
ones.
The amortized3 total cost of water extraction was worked out to be Rs
23.09 per hour in the semi-arid region and Rs 31.39 in the arid region. It was
higher in the arid region because of higher installed capacity of motors (30-
40 HP). The per hour average selling price was found to be Rs 122.80 in
the arid region and Rs 35.46 in the semi-arid region, which were substantially
higher than the corresponding operational cost as well as the total cost of
water extraction in both the regions (Table 5). This implied that groundwater
markets were exploitative in nature for the buyers of water. The exploitation
of buyers was more in kind-based contracts in the arid region than in the
semi-arid region. In the arid region, buyers of water had to surrender their
two-fifths of crop-output to the sellers of water as the water price and it
was exorbitant for the buyers of water. Most of the buyers were farmers
with small landholdings and they had limited livelihood options with them
under the arid and semi-arid conditions of Rajasthan. Therefore, they had to
participate in water trading on the existing terms and conditions for their
assured employment opportunities and food security. The higher water prices
in kind-based contracts were also reported by Janakrajan (1993), Palanisami
and Balasubramanian (1998), Satyasai et al. (1997) and Shah (1993).
Sellers of water earned a net profit of Rs 18.81 per hour over the
operational cost and Rs 12.37 per hour over the total cost of water extraction
in the semi-arid region and Rs 107.88 per hour and Rs 91.41 per hour,Sharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 51
respectively in the arid region. Thus, selling of water was a remunerative
business economically for the sellers of water.
Determinants of Water Buying Decision
The groundwater markets provided an opportunity to non-owners of
irrigation well on a particular parcel of land to irrigate crops, raise farm
productivity, generate employment for family members, and enhance income.
There were several factors, which affected the groundwater buying-decision
of the farmers. The relative importance of these factors were quantified by
using a logit regression as water buying was a binary variable.
The important variables selected and maximum likelihood estimates of
the coefficients of logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 6. The
model fitted very well to the data as indicated by large observed significance
of log likelihood ratio test and Chi-square test, which was significant at one
per cent level. The model provided correct prediction to the extent of 94 per
cent of the dependent variable.
The results of the logistic regression analysis suggested that the most
significant factors affecting the farmer’s groundwater buying-decision were
the size of farm holdings, extent of farm fragmentation, capacity of water
lifting device installed on the well/tube-wells, and education of the decision-
maker in family. With a few exceptions, the estimation yielded the expected
Table 6. Logistic regression coefficients of factors affecting buying of groundwater
(Buying=1, and  0 otherwise)
Factors Coefficient t-ratio Odds ratio Probability
AREAOWN -0.68* -4.26 0.51 0.34
FRAGMENT 3.37* 4.03 29.11 0.97
PJOINWL 0.01 1.03 1.01 0.50
HPPERWL -0.22* -4.02 0.80 0.45
EDUCATIO -0.18*** -1.68 0.84 0.46
PFWORK 0.04 0.72 1.04 0.51
PNFINC -0.03 -1.16 0.97 0.49
PHVCR 0.04 1.20 1.04 0.51
Intercept -1.72 -0.53
Cumulative Probability (P) 0.891
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signs for the independent variables. However, the variable with unexpected
sign was not significant, as shown by the respective t-ratio.
From the results of logistic regression analysis it could be inferred that
with one unit increase in the size of landholdings with farmers, the probability
of buying groundwater was reduced to 34 per cent. Higher the fragmentation
of the landholdings, greater was the chance of buying groundwater for
irrigation. The probability of buying groundwater has increased by 97 per
cent with one unit increase in land fragmentation. In other words, the farmers
having larger size of operational holdings that were less fragmented had
lower chance of buying groundwater. This observation was consistent with
the findings of Kolavalli and Chicoine (1989); Saleth (1996), Meinzen-Dick
(1996) and Singh (1998). On the other hand, the small farmers had higher
chance of buying groundwater, who neither had the financial capacity nor
break-even land to install their own wells/tube-wells.
The capacity of the water-lifting device installed on the well/tube-well
measured in terms of horse power per well was also significantly impacting
the decision of the farmers to buy groundwater. Results of the analysis
showed that with the unit increase in the capacity of the water-lifting device,
the chances of buying groundwater reduced by about 45 per cent. If the
decision-maker was educated adequately, the probability of buying costly
irrigation water reduced by around 46 per cent. A well-educated decision-
maker’s rational decision would, of course, be not to go for buying of water
but choose alternatives like installing joint-wells.
Factors like family workers per unit area (51%) and higher proportion
of gross cropped area (50%) to high-value crops and the proportion of the
joint installed wells (50%) had positive effects on buying of groundwater,
though these coefficients turned out to be non-significant. This implied that
the farmer with more workers per unit area and higher fraction of gross
cropped area under high-value cash crops had more chance of buying
groundwater. The higher proportion of family income from non-farming
sources reduced the buying-probability of groundwater.
Legal Status of Groundwater
The legal status of groundwater immensely differed from the popular
perception of being a common property or open access resource. Based on
the dominant heritage principle implied in the Transfer of Property Rights
Act IV of 1882, the Easement Act of 1882 allowed private usufructuary
rights in groundwater by viewing it as an easement connected to land (Singh,
1991; Saleth, 1996).Sharma & Sharma: Study of Groundwater Markets in Rajasthan 53
The groundwater markets are the village-level informal market institutions
in which there is neither clear assignment of rights nor legal sanction to
trade. Under the current legal regime, groundwater is an easement attached
to land. So, from a strictly legal sense, groundwater being an easement
connected to land cannot be sold apart from land, especially to make profit.
This is so because under the Easement Act of 1882, an easement right is
meant essentially to gain certain conveniences but not meant for making
profit which is possible under profit a pendre kind of rights (Singh, 1991).
The right approach should be to optimize the returns as well as resource-
use rather than maximize. Also, the model bill framed to regulate and control
the exploitation of groundwater does not touch the issue.
There should be a relevant water rights allocation system based on
equitable utilization in which individual water rights are established so as to
optimize the resource allocation. The optimum allocation of the resource at
the societal point of view could be achieved by that price of water which is
determined by the demand and supply forces. Under the current practice of
groundwater markets the water prices are determined by the customs/
conventions rather than the demand and supply forces. These informal water
markets, based on undefined property rights system, are incapable of
determining right price. Therefore, the water sellers are charging exorbitant
price from the poor, small and marginal farmers. Though the prevalence of
groundwater markets in the region has helped poor farmers in the physical
access to the resource and in terms of employment for their family, in strict
economic terms these markets are becoming the means of increasing
inequality among the resource-rich, large farmers and the resource-poor
small farmers.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Though the groundwater markets have facilitated to mitigate inequality
in the physical access to the resource, i.e. irrigation water, among the
resource-rich large and the resource-poor small farmers. The sellers of
water are charging exorbitant prices, i.e. more than three-times of the cost
of water extraction for buyers as water price. In this way GWMs have
become exploitative for the buyers of water, and contribute to increasing
inequality among the rich and poor farmers, whereas for the sellers it has
become economically a remunerative business. Thus, selling groundwater
has become a growing business for making private profit at the social cost.
The impact of groundwater markets on the small and marginal farmers
and rural inequality in the long-run should become key points in formulating
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The prevailing terms of water transactions, particularly in-kind terms, lead
to the over-exploitation of the groundwater resources. The credit policies
and the power pricing policies of the government also help the unsustainable
and inequitable use of the resource. Therefore, the state has the major role
to play through proper policy measures, regulating the practice of water
markets (granting formal status) and their effective implementation.
Recharging of abandoned wells, mainly for the sellers of water, should be
made essential for the efficient and sustainable use of this scarce natural
resource.
The logit regression has suggested that the farmers having lower farm-
size holdings with higher fragmented-land have higher probability of buying
groundwater. The consolidation of holdings may economize the irrigation
investment and lead to efficient management of resources of the farmers.
Education of the farmers is significantly affecting the buying probability
of groundwater, implying thereby that with the increased awareness among
the farmers, this scarce natural resource could be optimally utilized. In
national as well as state water policies and in the Model bill to regulate and
control the groundwater resources, this is not even seen and given any
consideration or emphasis.
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Notes:
1. The districts where the net annual groundwater draft was more than
100 per cent or in the range of 90-100 per cent of the net annual
groundwater recharge were categorized as over-exploited or critical.
2 (a) Self-Users + Sellers: They are the owners of WEMs and their
landholdings are consolidated. They sell surplus water to other farmers
because their landholdings are small to utilize the full capacity of WEM
and water markets offer an opportunity to spread its overhead expenses
by increasing the WEM utilization.
(b) Self-users + Sellers + Buyers: Existence and operation of this
form of water markets is due to high degree of farm fragmentation.
On the big parcel of holding, farmers install a WEM to irrigate their
field, supply surplus water to neighbouring farmers, and go for buying
on the other parcel.
(c) Self-users + Buyers: This form of water markets exists generally
because of fragmentation of holdings. When the farmers install a
WEM on the big fragments to irrigate their fields only, the lack of56 Agricultural Economics Research Review  Vol.19  January-June 2006
surplus water for the other parcel of land or inaccessibility compels
them to purchase water from the neighbouring WEM owners.
(d) Buyers: This form of water markets arises mainly because of small
size of holdings. Buyers are generally resource-poor farmers and
they do not get a suitable partner to pool their resources to install a
WEM. Another important reason is economic viability of WEM due
to small and fragmented holding. These farmers buy sufficient water
from neighboring WEM as and when required.
(e) Self-users: Water markets do not exist in this category of farmers
because they have WEMs to irrigate their fields only. Landholdings
are generally consolidated. The self-users do not enter the water
markets because neither they have surplus water to sell nor are
interested to buy from others.
(f) Non-users: Water markets do not exist in this category of farmers
also because of very small size and fragmented holdings that are
away from the WEMs. The farmers are resource-poor and lagged in
nature whose available labour force is engaged in non-farm activities.
These farmers do not enter the water markets because they have
very small holdings
3. Investment on tube-well was amortized over 15 years (average life of
a tube-well), at 12 per cent per annum (opportunity cost of capital) to
arrive at the annual cost of water extraction. The annual cost was then
divided by the total duration (in hours) of running a tubewell  in a year
to arrive at the per hour cost of water extraction.